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Overview

Tools are how an agent acts on the world — running shell commands, reading files, calling APIs. Each tool exposes itself to the LLM as a JSON Schema, and the agent invokes it through a unified streaming interface. AgentScope organizes tool-related building blocks under three concepts:
  • Tool — any class that satisfies the ToolBase interface, including the built-ins shipped with AgentScope and the FunctionTool / MCPTool adapters that wrap plain functions or MCP-server tools.
  • Toolkit — the container that registers tools, MCP clients, and skills, exposes their JSON schemas to the model, and dispatches each tool call to the right tool object.
  • Tool Group — a named bundle of tools, MCP clients, and skills that can be activated or deactivated as a unit. The agent toggles groups at runtime via the built-in meta tool to keep its context focused.
A Toolkit created with tools alone exposes those tools in the special "basic" group, which is always active. Adding mcps, skills_or_loaders, or extra tool_groups extends what the agent can reach — see the sections below.

Python Tool

A Python tool is any object satisfying the ToolBase interface. AgentScope ships built-in tools for common operations and exposes the same interface for developers to build custom tools.

ToolBase Interface

ToolBase is the abstract base class every tool satisfies. The tables below list its attributes and methods. Attributes that describe the tool to the agent and the runtime: Methods that hook into execution and the permission system:

Use Built-in Tools

AgentScope ships a set of ready-to-use tools covering common agent operations. Instantiate them and pass into Toolkit(tools=[...]):
Two more tools — the reset_tools meta tool and the Skill viewer — are auto-registered by Toolkit whenever extra tool groups or skills exist. Developers do not instantiate them directly. See Manage Tools Agentically and Skill.

Bash

The Bash tool executes shell commands and returns stdout/stderr. It implements every optional interface method to provide fine-grained permission control. check_permissions() runs a layered safety analysis on the command string:
  1. Injection risk detection — flags dynamic shell structures ($(...), backticks, process substitution) that cannot be statically analyzed → ASK
  2. Read-only command detection — auto-allows safe commands (git status, ls, cat, grep, docker ps, etc.), including compound commands where every subcommand is read-only → ALLOW
  3. Dangerous command patterns — detects destructive operations (e.g. chmod 777, mkfs) → ASK
  4. Sed constraint check — blocks in-place sed -i against dangerous files → ASK
  5. Dangerous path protection — checks if the command operates on sensitive config files (.bashrc, .ssh/, .env) → ASK
  6. Dangerous removal detection — catches rm / rmdir targeting critical system paths (/, ~, /usr) → ASK
  7. ACCEPT_EDITS mode — auto-allows filesystem commands (mkdir, touch, rm, rmdir, mv, cp, sed) only when every target path resolves inside a configured working directory. A command that touches any path outside the working set (e.g. cp /etc/hosts /tmp/x) falls through to PASSTHROUGH instead of auto-allowing.
check_read_only() returns True for any command identified by the read-only detector above (step 2), and False otherwise. The permission engine uses it to decide auto-allow in EXPLORE / ACCEPT_EDITS without re-running the full safety analysis. match_rule() uses prefix-based wildcard matching against the command string: generate_suggestions() extracts the command prefix (first two tokens) and proposes a prefix rule. For example, git commit -m "fix bug" produces the suggestion git commit:*. The constructor accepts optional extra entries for the dangerous-path lists:

File Tools (Read, Write, Edit)

The file tools enforce a read-before-write rule: Write and Edit require the target file to have been read via Read first. This prevents blind overwrites and ensures the agent always operates on current content. check_permissions()Write and Edit share the same permission logic:
  1. Dangerous path protection — operations on sensitive files (.bashrc, .env, .ssh/) return a bypass-immune ASK (bypass_immune=True), so allow rules cannot silently authorize them. The ASK is still skipped in BYPASS mode (which opts out of safety prompts by design) and converted to DENY in DONT_ASK mode. See the permission system docs for the full contract.
  2. ACCEPT_EDITS mode — auto-allows operations on files within configured working directories
  3. PASSTHROUGH — falls through to the permission engine for rule matching
Read is read-only and always returns PASSTHROUGH (the engine handles EXPLORE-mode and ACCEPT_EDITS-mode auto-allow via check_read_only). match_rule() — all three tools use fnmatch glob matching against the file_path argument: generate_suggestions() proposes a glob covering the parent directory. For example, editing /project/src/main.py produces the suggestion src/**.

Create Custom Tool

To create a custom tool, subclass ToolBase, declare its schema, and implement check_permissions and __call__:
Two extension hooks worth knowing about when writing custom tools with safety logic:
  • check_read_only(tool_input) — override when whether an invocation modifies state depends on the input (like Bash: ls is read-only, rm is not). Defaults to returning the static is_read_only attribute. The permission engine calls it before deciding EXPLORE / ACCEPT_EDITS auto-allow.
  • PermissionDecision(..., bypass_immune=True) — set on a returned ASK to mark it as a safety check that allow rules cannot silence (e.g. a DeployTool flagging prod-* targets). See the safety check contract for per-mode handling.

Wrap Function as Tool

For lightweight cases that don’t justify a full subclass, wrap a plain Python function with the FunctionTool adapter. It auto-extracts the tool name from func.__name__, the description from the function docstring, and the input schema from type hints.
FunctionTool accepts overrides when the auto-extracted defaults are not what you want:
Wrapped functions default to ASK permission behavior — the user must explicitly allow each call. Subclass ToolBase directly when you need custom permission logic.

Define External Execution Tool

An external execution tool delegates its actual execution outside the agent runtime — typically to a human operator or an external system. When the agent calls one, it emits a RequireExternalExecutionEvent and pauses until the result is delivered via ExternalExecutionResultEvent. This pattern underlies the human-in-the-loop workflow, where certain actions require human approval or manual execution. To create an external execution tool, set is_external_tool = True. There is no need to implement __call__:

MCP

AgentScope integrates with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, letting an agent reach any MCP-compatible tool provider. The framework handles protocol negotiation, tool discovery, and result conversion automatically. Two connection modes are supported:
  • Stateful (STDIO or HTTP) — persistent session with explicit connect() / close() lifecycle
  • Stateless (HTTP only) — ephemeral session created per tool call, no lifecycle management needed
MCP tools are namespaced as mcp__{server_name}__{tool_name} to avoid name collisions, and tools annotated with readOnlyHint are recognized as read-only by the permission system (auto-allowed in EXPLORE and ACCEPT_EDITS modes; in DEFAULT they still ASK unless an allow rule matches).

Register MCP Tool

Build one or more MCPClient instances and pass them to Toolkit(mcps=[...]). Stateful clients must be connected before the toolkit is constructed.
To expose only a subset of an MCP server’s tools, set enable_tools or disable_tools on the client itself:
If you need to invoke MCP tools outside a Toolkit, call await client.list_tools() to retrieve a list of MCPTool adapters and use them like any other ToolBase instance.

Skill

Skills are markdown-based instruction sets that extend agent capabilities without writing new tool code. Each skill is a directory containing a SKILL.md file with frontmatter metadata and detailed instructions. Unlike tools, skills are not callable directly. The agent uses the auto-registered Skill viewer tool to read a skill’s instructions, then follows those instructions using its existing tools.

Register Skill

Pass skill sources to the Toolkit constructor through skills_or_loaders. Each entry can be a directory path string, a Skill object, or a SkillLoaderBase subclass:

How Skill Works

When a Toolkit is constructed with skills, the registration and lookup flow runs in two phases. At initialization:
  • The toolkit scans every registered skill source and collects each skill’s name, description, and directory.
  • It auto-registers the built-in Skill viewer tool.
  • It composes a system-prompt fragment listing the available skills (name and description only) and instructing the agent to invoke the Skill viewer to read the full content.
At runtime:
  • The agent picks a skill by name and calls the Skill viewer.
  • The viewer reads the corresponding SKILL.md and returns its full markdown.
  • The agent follows those instructions using its already-equipped tools.
Skills are not tools — the agent cannot call a skill directly. It must first use the Skill viewer to read the instructions, then execute the steps described within using its other tools.

Manage Tools Agentically

The built-in meta tool (reset_tools) lets the agent self-manage which tool groups are active at runtime. This keeps its context focused — only tools relevant to the current task are exposed.

Define Tool Group

A ToolGroup is a named bundle of tools, MCP clients, and skills. Pass groups to Toolkit(tool_groups=[...]). The reserved "basic" group is created automatically from the constructor’s top-level tools, mcps, and skills_or_loaders arguments and is always active.
ToolGroup accepts the same tools, mcps, and skills_or_loaders arguments as the toolkit, plus a description shown to the agent in the meta tool schema and an optional instructions string returned when the group is activated.

Use Meta Tool

When at least one non-basic tool group exists, Toolkit auto-registers reset_tools and exposes its schema to the agent. Each non-basic group becomes a boolean field on that schema, and the agent calls the meta tool with the desired final state. The behavior at runtime:
  • Tools in the "basic" group are always exposed; they are never affected by the meta tool.
  • Each call to reset_tools overwrites the activated set — any non-basic group not explicitly set to True becomes inactive, regardless of its previous state.
  • For each group transitioning to active, its instructions (when provided) are concatenated and returned in the meta tool’s response, telling the agent how to use that group properly.
  • Tools from inactive groups are hidden from the agent’s tool schema, freeing context space for the active set.
The meta tool input represents the final state of all groups, not incremental changes. Any group not explicitly set to True will be deactivated, regardless of its previous state.

Further Reading

Agent

How agents orchestrate tool calls in the ReAct loop

Permission System

Fine-grained control over which tools can execute and when

Middleware

Intercept and transform tool calls with onion-style middleware

Human-in-the-Loop

External execution tools and human approval workflows